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First Impressions 
The following pages contain brief summaries of issues of first 
impression identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced 
between September 4, 2014 and February 18, 2015.  This collection, 
written by the members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized by 
circuit. 
Each summary briefly describes an issue of first impression, and is 
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the issue, not a 
comprehensive analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: First Impressions, 11 
SETON HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2015). 
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FIRST  CIRCUIT 
Butterworth v. United States, 775 F.3d 459 (1st Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether “the rule announced in Alleyne v. United 
States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), applies retroactively to sentences 
challenged on an initial petition for collateral review?”  Id. at 461. 
ANALYSIS: The court began with 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) to decide 
whether the statute permitted the court to make a “retroactivity 
determination on an initial petition for collateral review.”  Id. at 464.   The 
court joined the 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 11th circuits and concluded that it could 
issue opinions on “initial petitions for collateral review holding in the first 
instance that a new rule is retroactive in the absence of a specific finding 
to that effect by the Supreme Court.”  Id.   Nevertheless, the court 
determined that Alleyne “did not cut a new rule from whole cloth, but 
rather clarified and extended the scope of two well-settled principles of 
criminal procedure: the defendant’s right to a jury trial and the 
government’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 468. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit concluded that “the rule announced in 
Alleyne [was] not retroactively applicable to sentences on collateral review 
on an initial habeas petition.”  Id. 
 
 
 
Ira Green, Inc. v. Military Sales & Serv. Co., 775 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a party who requests a jury poll must act 
reasonably to preserve its rights to do so.  Id. at 16. 
ANALYSIS: The Court first explained that the 2009 update to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 48 clarified that a party was entitled to a 
mandatory jury poll upon a timely request.  Id. at 25.  The court recognized 
that a gray area exists in regards to the civil context and jury polls, but 
declined to address this issue in the present case.  Id. at 26.  The court 
instead focused on the timing of the jury poll, and determined that if a 
party makes two requests of the court, and the court inadvertently fails to 
make a ruling on one of the requests, that failure to rule cannot be 
construed as a denial by the court.  Id. at 26.  The court further posited that 
when a court forgets to answer a party’s request, it is the party’s 
responsibility to act reasonably by making the request again.  Id. at 26–27. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that when a party has ample time 
to remind the court of its request for a jury poll, but fails to do so, the party 
has acted unreasonably and thus waives or forfeits the right to a jury poll.  
Id. 
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Romulus v. CVS Pharm. Inc., 770 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: What is the meaning of “other paper” under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1446(b)(3). 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the phrase “other paper” in Section 
1446(b)(3) was ambiguous, but concluded that there was “clear 
Congressional intent” to interpret the phrase broadly.  Id.  at 77.  The court 
reasoned that § 1446(b)(3)’s use of “other paper” should seemingly be 
“limited to documents similar to a pleading, motion, or order,” under the 
doctrine of ejusdem generis.  Id.  The court further stated that another part 
of the statute, § 1446(c)(3)(A) supports a “broader textual interpretation,” 
by stating that “[]information relating to the amount in controversy in the 
record of the State proceeding, or in responses to discovery, shall be 
treated as an ‘other paper’ under subsection (b)(3).”  Id.  Lastly, the court 
noted that federal circuit courts have “given the reference to ‘other paper’ 
an expansive construction,” and have included a wide variety of 
documents within the scope of this phrase.  Id. at 78. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the an email belonging to the 
plaintiff, providing the defendant with notice that the criteria for removal 
are met, constitutes “other paper” for purposes of section 1446(b)(3), and 
by doing so, adopted a broad interpretation of the phrase “other paper.”  
Id. 
 
 
United States v. McCormick, 773 F.3d 357 (1st Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether an “accessory” qualifies as a “participant” in a 
criminal activity for “purposes of an upward role-in-the-offense 
adjustment under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1.”  Id. at 
360. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the guideline provision states “if the 
defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal 
activity, her offense level should [ . . . ] be increased by two levels.”  Id.  
The court reasoned that such an increase may occur only if the government 
proves that “(1) the criminal enterprise involved at least two complicit 
participants (of whom the defendant may be counted as one), and (2) the 
defendant, in committing the offense, exercised control over, organized, 
or was otherwise responsible for superintending the activities of, at least 
one of those other persons.”  Id.  Further, the court determined that the 
appellant in the instant matter aced as an accessory by performing the role 
of the getaway driver in a robbery.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “a party who knowingly 
assists in a criminal enterprise is responsible as an accessory . . . ” and that 
“such a level of engagement is sufficient to qualify the accessory as a 
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‘participant’ in a criminal activity for purposes of an upward role-in-the-
offense adjustment under Section 3B1.1.  Id. at 360–61. 
 
 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
 
 
Calderon-Cardona v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 770 F.3d 993 (2d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether “petitioners are precluded from 
recovering because North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of 
terrorism was revoked in 2008, prior to the entry of the underlying 
judgment?” Id. at 996. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit stated that after the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act (TRIA) was enacted, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g), 
which allowed attachment for judgments obtained under 1605(A).  Id. at 
999.  The court noted that the section allowed “attachment of property of 
a foreign state but also property of an agency or instrumentality.”  Id.  The 
court emphasized that in order to attach assets under TRIA there needed 
to be a judgment against a terrorist party, however, the underlying 
judgment that was entered against North Korea was entered when North 
Korea was “no longer designated a state sponsor of terrorism.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION:   The 2nd Circuit held that since the judgment 
was not entered against a terrorist party, the judgment could not attach the 
ETFs under TRIA § 201(a).  Id. 1000. 
QUESTION TWO: Whether “the EFTs sought to be attached are the 
property of North Korea, or of its agencies or instrumentalities, and 
therefore properly subject to execution to satisfy a judgment against North 
Korea.” Id. at 996. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit began by noting that § 1610(g) was not 
limited to current states that designated terrorism the way TRIA was 
limited.  Id. at 1000.  The court further explained that whether there could 
be an attachment of the EFTs under section 1610(g) turned “on whether 
the blocked EFTs at issue are “property of” North Korea or “the property 
of an agency or instrumentality” of North Korea.”  Id.  Ultimately, the 
court found that since Congress had not defined the property interest that 
were subject to attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA), the court had to look to state law on the issue of the rights of 
debtors and creditors.  Id. at 1001. 
CONCLUSION:   The 2nd Circuit held “that an EFT blocked 
midstream is ‘property of a foreign state’ or ‘the property of an agency or 
instrumentality of such a state,’ subject to attachment under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1610(g), only where either the state itself or an agency or instrumentality 
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thereof (such as a state-owned financial institution) transmitted the EFT 
directly to the bank where the EFT is held pursuant to the block.”  Id. at 
1002. 
 
Coggins v. Buonora, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 487 (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 2015) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a law enforcement officer is entitled to 
absolute immunity as a grand jury witness, pursuant to Rehberg v. Paulk, 
132 S.Ct. 1497 (2012), when a plaintiff alleges that the officer withheld 
and falsified evidence in addition to committing perjury before the grand 
jury under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Id. at 8. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that in Rehberg, the Court allowed 
law enforcement officials to claim absolute immunity from § 1983 claims 
only when those claims were based on the officers’ grand jury testimony 
alone.  Id.  The court then found that if a plaintiff’s claim exists 
independently of an officer’s grand jury testimony, it is not “based on” 
that grand jury testimony, as that term is used in Rehberg, and thus that 
holding does not apply.  Id. at 9–10.  The court concluded that “when a 
police officer claims absolute immunity for his grand jury testimony under 
Rehberg,” the court should first “determine whether the plaintiff can make 
out the elements of his § 1983 claim without resorting to the grand jury 
testimony,” instead of making a per se determination that the officer is 
entitled to absolute immunity.  Id. at 10. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that police officers are not 
afforded “absolute immunity from all civil suits for conduct other than 
their grand jury testimony,” therefore declining to extend police officers 
per se absolute immunity from civil liability when officers withhold or 
falsify evidence before a grand jury.  Id. at 10–12. 
 
Hausler v. J.P Morgan Bank, N.A., 770 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether § 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 
2002, 28 U.S.C. § 1610, (“TRIA”) permits attachment of blocked 
Electronic Fund Transfers (“EFTs”) pursuant to the Cuban Control 
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.311(a), in order to satisfy a state court 
judgment.  Id. at 210. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that because Congress did not define the 
types of property interests that may be subject to attachment under TRIA 
§ 201(a), and because ETFs were not identified under Cuban Assets 
Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.311(a), as “blocked assets,” then the 
court must look to New York property law to fill the gap.  Id. at 211–12.  
Relying on prior Second Circuit precedent, the court found that “under 
New York law ‘EFTs are neither the property of the originator nor the 
beneficiary while briefly in the possession of an intermediary bank.’”  Id. 
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at 212.  Thus, the court concluded that only the entity that passed the 
stopped EFT to the bank has a property interest.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that, because no Cuban entity 
transmitted any of the blocked EFTs directly to the blocking bank, neither 
Cuba nor its agents or instrumentalities had any property interest in the 
EFTs blocked at the garnishee banks, and therefore, because no terrorist 
party had a property interest in the EFTs, they were not attachable under 
TRIA § 201.  Id. 
 
Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: What is the appropriate analysis for determining 
whether a claim under the Alien Tort Statute of 1789 (“ATS”), 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350, sufficiently “touches and concerns” the United States to displace 
the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS? Id. at 183. 
ANALYSIS: The court first stated that the ATS is a strictly 
jurisdictional statute, which “must be narrowly read . . . to be kept within 
the confines of Article III.”  Id. at 178 (internal citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court next recognized that the jurisdictional 
requirements that a party must meet to bring a claim under the ATS were 
as follows: “(1) the complaint pleads a violation of the law of nations; (2) 
the presumption against the extraterritorial application of the ATS . . . does 
not bar the claim; (3) customary international law recognizes liability for 
the defendant; and (4) the theory of liability alleged by plaintiffs (i.e., 
aiding and abetting, conspiracy) is recognized by customary international 
law.”  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that a plaintiff bringing a claim 
under the ATS can displace the presumption against extraterritoriality 
after satisfying a two-part test, by first, showing the alleged conduct 
touches and concerns the territory of the United States, and, second, by 
adequately stating a claim that the defendant committed the violation.  Id. 
 
Ret. Bd. of the Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chi. v. Bank of 
N.Y. Mellon, 775 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether certain certificates are exempt from the Trust 
Indenture Act (“TIA”) of 1939, under § 304(a)(2).  Id. at 154. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that § 304(a)(2) of the Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb, “exempts 
‘certificate[s] of interest or participation in two or more securities having 
substantially different rights and privileges.’”  Id. at 158.  The court found 
that, “[f]or a given instrument to be exempt from the TIA under 
§ 304(a)(2), the instrument must “(1) be a ‘certificate of interest or 
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participation’ in (2) ‘two or more securities’ that (3) hav[e] substantially 
different rights and privileges.’”  Id. at 165. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that “certificates issued by the 
PSA-governed New York trusts are exempt from the TIA under 
§ 304(a)(2).”  Id. at 157. 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
United States v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether a defendant may be charged for a more 
serious offense because the defendant thought that the bribe he or she had 
accepted was in furtherance of said offense.  Id. at 361, 364. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit stated that the cross-reference provision 
of the United States Sentencing Guideline § 2C1.1(c)(1) provides that if a 
defendant has committed an offense in furtherance of a more serious 
offense, then the defendant may be sentenced under the guidelines for 
conspiracy of that more serious offense.  Id. at 303.  The court noted that 
the defendant need not have been charged with or committed the more 
serious offense in order to be sentenced for conspiracy of that more serious 
offense, the defendant need only have committed a crime in furtherance of 
that offense.  Id. at 364.  The court declared that for the cross-reference 
provision in the Guidelines to apply, “the defendant must accept payments 
for the purpose of facilitating the commission of another criminal offense.”  
Id. at 367. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit concluded that if a defendant 
accepted a bribe in furtherance of a more serious crime, the defendant may 
be sentenced as if he had committed the more serious offense by virtue of 
the cross-reference provision in § 2C1.1(c)(1).  Id. at 364. 
QUESTION TWO: Whether a defendant may be sentenced to a two-
level enhancement for an abuse of a position of trust despite the fact that 
he is already serving an enhanced sentence calculated under the cross-
reference provision in §2C1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  
Id. at 368. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit stated § 2C1.1 has an express provision, 
which demonstrates that if a defendant has been sentenced under § 2C1.1 
then the enhancement for an abuse of position of trust shall not apply.  Id. 
at 369. The Court determined that although a sentence may be enhanced 
under the cross-reference provision of § 2D1.1, the enhancement for abuse 
of a position of trust may not be added on so long as the defendant was 
originally convicted and sentenced under §2C1.1 of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Id. 
2015] First Impressions 359 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit concluded that if a defendant has 
been sentenced under § 2C1.1, despite having an enhanced sentence 
pursuant to § 2D1.1 of the United State Sentencing Guidelines, there is a 
prohibition on applying the enhancement for abuse of a position of trust as 
well.  Id. 
 
United States v. Babaria, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24656 (3d Cir. Dec. 
31, 2014) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the medical director and manager of a 
Medicare and Medicaid provider who supervised the payment of 
kickbacks occupied a position of trust” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 
(2013).  Id. at *1. 
ANALYSIS: The court, in order to determine whether the defendant 
had a “position of trust” under § 3B1.3, considered “(1) whether the 
position allows the defendant to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) 
the degree of authority to which the position vests in defendant vis-à-vis 
the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there has been reliance on 
the integrity of the person occupying the position.”  Id. at *5.  The court 
first reasoned that a physician who was the medical director and manager 
of a healthcare center, with no supervision, put him in a unique position to 
commit the crime.  Id. at *6–7.  The court next noted that the defendant 
physician “utilized his position as [the] medical director and manager to 
supervise and conceal the payments of kickbacks” and that this “level of 
authority and the lack of supervision over his actions enabled him to 
commit the offense and evade detection.”  Id. at *8–9. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that the medical director and 
manager who oversaw the kickback payments occupies a position of trust, 
and thus, the two level sentencing enhancement applies under §3B1.3.  Id. 
at *1, *10. 
 
Watkins v. DineEquity, Inc., U.S. App. Lexis 21273 (3d Cir. Nov. 7, 
2014) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the omission of beverage prices from a 
restaurant menu falls within [the New Jersey’s Truth-in-Consumer 
Contract, Warranty and Notice Act’s] prohibition against the inclusion of 
any provision in a covered writing that violates a legal right of a consumer 
or responsibility of a seller.”  Id. at *4. 
ANALYSIS: The court conducted a plain reading of the underlying 
statute to determine that the phrase, “which includes any provision,” 
indicated that the New Jersey legislature intended New Jersey’s Truth-in 
Consumer Contract, Warrant and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”) “to cover only 
the inclusion of illegal provisions, and not omissions.”  Id. at *8.  The court 
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then noted that cases in which a seller engaged in fraudulent or duplicitous 
behavior, like charging different prices for a beverage in different parts of 
a restaurant, fell within the TCCWNA’s prohibitions, and were thus 
distinguishable from the case at bar.  Id. at *10–11. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that a mere omission of a 
beverage price on a menu was insufficient to show a violation of New 
Jersey’s TCCWNA.  Id. at *11–12. 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
E.L. v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 773 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether the [Individuals with Disabilities Act 
(“IDEA”)] allows states to implement a two-tiered review process, when 
both tiers are administered at the state level.”  Id. at 524. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the majority of courts that faced this 
issue have no problem with states implementing a two-tiered review 
process concentrated at the state level.  Id. at 514.  The court recognized 
that “the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement serves the important purpose of 
allowing states to use their special expertise to resolve educational 
disputes.”  Id.  Further, the court recognized that the Supreme Court 
concluded that the hearing provisions of the IDEA “contemplate that ‘a 
state educational agency conduct the administrative review immediately 
preceding any civil action.”  Id. at 515.  The court reasoned that North 
Carolina’s “decision to add an additional level of review before the State 
Board of Education only enhances procedural protections for disabled 
students.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that the IDEA allows states to 
implement a two-tiered review process, when both tiers are administered 
at the state level.”  Id. at 511. 
 
United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the “vulnerable victim enhancement,” 
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1), was improper where the district court already 
applied enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) and 2G2.2(b)(2) 
for a victim under the age of twelve.  Id. at 171. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that the vulnerable victim 
enhancement can be applied when the defendant “knew or should have 
known that the victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim.”  Id.  The 
court noted, however, that § 3A1.1(b)(1) specifies that it should not be 
applied if the factor that makes the person vulnerable has already been 
incorporated into the offense guideline.  Id.  The court acknowledged that 
the 5th and 9th Circuits have allowed the vulnerable victim standard to be 
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applied in cases involving children younger than the victim involved in 
this case.  Id. at 171–172.  The court distinguished those decisions because 
the findings of “vulnerable victim” status in those cases rested on the fact 
that toddlers have traits such as the inability to walk or communicate 
which make them extremely vulnerable.  Id. at 172. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that, while there may be 
situations where a vulnerable victim enhancement can be applied to 
children under the age of twelve, it cannot be applied when the victim’s 
characteristics that made her vulnerable were solely related to her age.  Id. 
at 174. 
 
United States v. Ward, 770 F.3d 1090 (4th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the holding in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2151 (2013) applies in the context of a supervised release revocation 
hearing. Id. at 1096. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the Supreme Court in Alleyene 
extended earlier protections to require “that a jury determine beyond a 
reasonable doubt any fact requiring imposition of a mandatory minimum 
sentence.”  Id. at 1097.  The court then distinguished Alleyene’s protection 
in the context of supervised revocation hearings, and observed that 
revocation hearings are not considered part of a criminal prosecution.  Id.  
The court further noted that the distinction between criminal proceedings 
and revocation hearings is significant, in that revocation hearings are less 
formal proceedings that do not deprive individuals of their “absolute 
liberty.”  Id. at 1098. 
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that the constitutional 
protections the Court afforded in Alleyne do not apply in the context of 
supervised revocation hearings.  Id. at 1092. 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
 
Cisneros-Guerrerro v. Holder, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24525 (5th Cir. 
Dec. 29, 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether an alien’s criminal offense of public-lewdness 
under Texas Penal Code § 21.07 was a crime involving moral turpitude, 
thus barring him from cancellation of removal.  Id. at *3. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Attorney General “may cancel 
removal of, and adjust the status of an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the 
United States[.]”  Id.  The court further noted that for an alien who has 
been convicted of “a crime involving moral turpitude,” the alien is 
ineligible for cancelation removal.  Id. at *4.   The court recognized that a 
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two-part test must be utilized to determine whether such an offense is a 
crime involving moral turpitude: first, the court must assess “whether the 
minimum reading of the statute necessarily reaches only offenses 
involving moral turpitude, and, of not, then the court proceeds to 
determine whether “the statute has multiple subsections or an element 
phrased in the disjunctive, such that some violations of the statute would 
involve moral turpitude and others not.” Id. at *5–6 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The court concluded that if this two-part test is met, the 
court must look to “the record of conviction to determine whether the alien 
was convicted under a part of the statute that describes a crime involving 
moral turpitude.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: After applying the two-step approach, the 5th Circuit 
held that the public lewdness statute §21.07 is not categorically labeled as 
crime involving moral turpitude.  Id. at *10–11. 
 
Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., 771 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s (SOX) 
whistleblower retaliation provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2), allows for 
noneconomic compensatory damages.  Id. at 263. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the SOX states that an employee 
who prevails on an anti-retaliation claim is entitled to “all relief necessary 
to make the employee whole,” which “shall include” reinstatement, back 
pay, and certain “special damages.”  Id. at 263–64.  The court recognized 
that the 10th Circuit has held that SOX allows for noneconomic 
compensatory damages, however, the opinion offered “scarce reasoning.”  
Id. at 264.  The court read the word “include” as non-exhaustive, and said 
that relief necessary to make an employee whole may be broader in scope 
than the three enumerated forms of relief included in the statute.  Id. at 
264.  The court reasoned that SOX’s language is comparable to that of the 
False Claims Act’s anti-retaliation provision, which also states that 
employees “shall be entitled to the relief necessary to make [them] whole.”  
Id. at 265. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that SOX affords “all relief 
necessary to make the employee whole,” and thus allows for noneconomic 
compensatory damages including emotional distress and reputational 
harm.  Id. 
 
MM Steel, L.P. v. JSW Steel (USA), Inc., 771 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether, for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(f), “a 
judgment is a lien on the judgment debtor’s property under Texas law”  Id. 
at 303 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit first noted that Rule 62(f) provides the 
ability for the judgment debtor to benefit from the state court stay of 
execution of a judgment if, “under the state law where the court is located” 
the judgment would be considered a lien on the property of the judgment 
debtor.”  Id.  The Court observed that the purpose of Rule 62(f) is to give 
as much deference as possible to state’s desire to permit someone to appeal 
a judgment without putting up a bond.  Id.  The court recognized that Texas 
procedures demand substantial compliance with the filing requirements of 
an abstract of judgment that “contains seven elements not necessarily 
contained in the judgment,” requires the creditor to oversee the whole 
process, including making that sure that the clerk “abstracts the judgment 
properly,” and can be thwarted by posting of a bond by the judgment 
debtor.  Id. at 304–06.  Thus, the Court determined that this process is 
“more than mere ministerial acts.”   Id.  at 306. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that a judgment in the state of 
State of Texas is not a lien that falls under Rule 62(f).   Id. 
 
United States v. King, 773 F.3d 48 (5th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “declining to apply the safety valve based on a 
judicially-determined fact is unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).”  Id. at 55. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that Alleyne held that “any fact that 
increases a statutory mandatory minimum sentence must be found by a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id.  The court further noted that the 
safety valve statute “provides that a defendant who qualifies for the 
safety valve shall be sentenced without regard to a statutory mandatory 
minimum sentence.”  Id. 
The court also stated that the 1st, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits have 
“found that Alleyne does not preclude judicial factfinding for safety valve 
determinations.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The Eight Circuit held that “it is not constitutional 
error for a judge to find facts that render the safety valve inapplicable.”  
Id. 
 
United States v. Ozorto, 772 F.3d 1053 (5th Cir. 2014). 
QUESTION: “[W]here a criminal defendant who has plead guilty 
signs a statement indicating that he wishes to appeal only his sentence, and 
where the defendant’s appellate counsel files an Anders brief addressing 
only issues related to sentencing, may the defendant raise issues related to 
his guilty plea and conviction in response to the Anders brief?”  Id. at 1054. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the 5th Circuit has previously 
held that counsel does not have to “file a transcript and brief the issues 
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surrounding [a defendant’s guilty] plea in an Anders brief where the record 
reflects that the defendant has chosen not to challenge the plea.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court further noted that this 5th 
Circuit precedent does not directly address the situation presented here, 
and that it was inclined to adopt a rule that “follows from general waiver 
principles.”  Id. at 1055.  The court found that if a defendant can “later 
broaden the scope of his appeal in contradiction of his prior expressed 
intent,” this would “create the possibility of two rounds of Anders 
briefing–one addressing the issues the defendant initially indicates he 
wants to challenge, and another addressing any additional issues raised in 
response to the first Anders brief.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “where a defendant provides 
sufficient indication . . . that he intends to challenge only his sentence, the 
defendant may not revoke that decision after counsel has filed an Anders 
brief permitting any discussion of a defendant’s guilty plea.”  Id. at 1054. 
 
United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 24 (5th 
Cir. Jan. 2, 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether a conviction under Texas Penal Code § 42.072, 
the “Texas Stalking Statute”, is a “crime of violence.”  Id.  at *6. 
ANALYSIS: The court consulted U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 n1(B)(iii)  for a 
definition of “crime of violence” and noted that there must be an element 
of threat, attempted use or use of physical force against another to qualify 
as a crime of violence.  Id.  at *6.  The court next analyzed what the use of 
force means according to case, and noted that “a defendant uses force if 
he intentionally avails[s] himself of that force.”  Id.  The court further 
determined that only enumerated or force offenses can be defined as 
crimes of violence, and that stalking must be a force offense in order to 
qualify, as it is not an enumerated offense.   Id.  The court reasoned that 
the elements of the offense in the conviction statute – and not the 
defendant’s conduct – determine whether a crime is a force offense.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit thus held that a conviction under the 
Texas Stalking Statute, when considered in the light of a charging 
indictment that does not refer to the threat, attempted use, or use of 
physical force, does not constitute a crime of violence under § 2L1.2 
n1(B)(iii).  Id.  at *10. 
 
Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., 775 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether “fatally defective pleadings [may] be corrected 
by proof taken at a default-judgment hearing.”  Id. at 695. 
ANALYSIS: The court first recognized that Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) 
“authorizes a court considering an application for default judgment to 
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“conduct hearings . . . when, to enter or effectuate judgment,” it needs 
to, inter alia, “establish the truth of any allegation by 
evidence . . . or . . . investigate any other matter,” but that no courts have 
held that “such a hearing would be appropriate to adduce facts necessary 
to state a claim that were absent from the pleading on which judgment was 
sought.”  Id. at 699.  The court next noted that none of its sister circuits 
had yet addressed the precise issue before the court, but that “precedents 
agree on the basic proposition that a default judgment must be founded on 
adequate pleadings.”  Id.  Lastly, the court noted that a rule that would 
permit a party “to cure facially deficient pleadings through evidence 
introduced at a damages hearing would disturb the careful compromise 
[its] cases have struck between fairness, finality, and justice.”  Id. at 701. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “a defective complaint 
cannot be redeemed by evidence presented at a prove-up hearing and 
therefore cannot support a default judgment absent amendment of the 
pleadings.”  Id. at 699. 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
 
Laborers’ Local 265 Pension Fund v. iShares Trust, 769 F.3d 399 (6th 
Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a 15 U.S.C. § 36(a) of the Investment Company 
Act (“ICA”) provides a private right of action.  Id. at 406. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit first found that the text of the ICA does 
not indicate “an intent by congress to create a private right of action under 
Section 36(a).”  Id. at 408.  The court found that, instead, the ICA’s first 
sentence stating “the commission is authorized to bring an action . . . ” 
does not contain any rights creating-language and is further bolstered by 
the language in § 42 of the statute that “empower[s] the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to enforce all ICA provisions.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Next, the court noted that the amendment to 
§ 36(b) adds a private right of action, and thus “strongly implies the 
absence of [a private right of action] in Section (36)(a).”  Id..  Finally, the 
Court noted that “the post-enactment legislative history relied upon [to 
prove that a private right of action exists] has little probative value because 
a post-enactment legislative body has no special insight regarding the 
intent of a past legislative body.”  Id. at 409. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that 15 U.S.C. § 36(a) does not 
provide a private right of action.  Id. at 406. 
 
Navistar, Inc. v. Forester, 767 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2014) 
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QUESTION: Whether a federal coal mine inspector qualifies as a coal 
miner for purposes of “the Black Lung Benefits Act (“BLBA”), 30 U.S.C. 
§§ 901–944, as amended by § 1556 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1556, 124 Stat. 119, 260 
(2010).”  Id. at 640. 
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by setting forth the elements 
that must be proven in order for a coal miner to receive benefits under the 
BLBA: “(1) he has pneumoconiosis; (2) his pneumoconiosis arose at least 
in part out of his coal mine employment; (3) he is totally disabled; and (4) 
the total disability is due to pneumoconiosis.”  Id. at 640.   The court noted 
that in order to meet the definition of a coal miner under the BLBA a 
person must pass a two part test in which he must show that he “worked 
in or around a statutorily defined coal mine” and his “duties involved the 
extraction or preparation of coal, or involved appropriate coal mine 
construction or transportation” Id. at 641.  The court posited that, unlike 
private coal mine inspectors that companies hire to inspect their mines and 
repair issues, federal coal mine inspectors serve “a purely regulatory 
function . . . not involved in the day-to-day overall operation of any 
particular mine;” therefore their functions cannot be considered “integral” 
or “necessary.”  Id. at 646. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “federal mine inspectors are 
not ‘miners’ for purposes of the BLBA.”  Id. at 647. 
 
Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 770 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 
2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e), prohibits a party from collecting 
statutory interest if it has waived its right to collect contractual interest?  
Id. at 445. 
ANALYSIS: The court posited that a party who contracts to collect a 
particular interest rate has “bargained away” the right to collect the 
statutory interest rate that would apply in the absence of the contract.  Id. 
at 448.  The court further noted that a debt collector, as a creditor’s 
assignee, was bound by the creditor’s waiver of the right to collect the 
statutory interest rate.  Id.  The court then observed that the FDCPA must 
be construed broadly, and that it applies to efforts to collect a debt through 
litigation.  Id. at 449.  The court remarked that, under the FDCPA, a 
lawsuit to collect statutory interest that had been waived by an agreement 
to collect contractual interest is an attempt to recover a debt to which the 
creditor has no legal right.  Id. at 451 
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CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that a party’s lawsuit to collect 
statutory interest after waiving its right to collect contractual interest 
violates the FDCPA.  Id. at 452. 
 
United States v. Smith, 582 Fed. App’x 590 (6th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether common-law robbery would be considered a 
crime of violence under North Carolina law.  Id. at 594. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the definition of common-law 
robbery, pursuant to North Carolina law, is “the felonious, non-consenual 
taking of money or personal property from the person or presence of 
another by means of violence or fear.”  Id.  The court further stated that 
only violence or fear must be proven in order for a conviction to stand for 
common law robbery.  Id.  The court determined that because the elements 
of common-law robbery come under the physical force clause found in at 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, it involves an element of physical force against another 
person.  Id. at 595. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that a common-law robbery in 
North Carolina constitutes a crime of violence because it comports with 
the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.  Id. at 601. 
SEVENTH  CIRCUIT 
 
Cirilli v. Bronk (In re Bronk), 775 F.3d  (7th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION ONE: Whether state college savings accounts were 
exempt by creditors under Wis. Stat. § 815.18(3)(p) “because account 
owners, not just account beneficiaries, could claim the exemption.”  Id. at 
872. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that, while Wisconsin’s exemption 
statute “allows debtors to exempt an interest in a college savings 
account . . . from execution by creditors,” the term “interest” is never 
specifically defined in any statute or regulation.  Id. at 875. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court, after analyzing the relevant 
Wisconsin statutes, noted that “the general exemption statute is succinct 
and straightforward,” and concluded that “[a] debtor may exempt ‘an 
interest in a college savings account . . . from execution by creditors.”  Id. 
at 876. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that “§815.18(3)(p) applies to an 
account owner’s interest in a . . . college savings account.”  Id. 
QUESTION TWO: Whether an annuity is a retirement benefit and 
qualifies to be exempt in full under Wis. Stat. § 815.18(3)(j).  Id. at *3. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the statute defines “annuity” as 
“a series of payments payable during the life of the annuitant or during a 
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specific period.”  Id. at 877.  The court noted that, to qualify for full 
exemption, a “retirement plan or contract must meet one of two additional 
requirements: (1) it must be employer sponsored; or (2) it must comply 
with the Internal Revenue Code.”  Id.  The court noted that, to qualify for 
a full exemption under § 815.18(3)(j), “an annuity must distribute benefits 
because of or conditioned on age, illness, disability, death, or length of 
service.”  Id.  The court reasoned that, because the annuity contained a 
death benefit, this feature brought “it under the umbrella of 
§ 815.18(3)(j).”  Id. at 878. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that, for an annuity, a debtor may 
“exempt [an annuity] in full under § 815.18.(3)(j) if it was employer 
sponsored or complied with the Internal Revenue Code.”  Id. 
 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
 
Alexander v. Avera St. Luke’s Hosp., 768 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)] 
claims involving employees should be governed by a six-factor “economic 
realities” test, rather than the “common-law agency principle” articulated 
in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. (1992).  Id. at 763. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that before Darden, most federal 
circuit courts employed a test for determining employee status under the 
FMLA that fused the “common-law test and the economic realities test.”  
Id. at 763–64.  However, the court noted that Darden did not prevent 
federal circuit courts from continuing to use their own hybrid tests; in fact, 
the Darden test differed in no significant way from the circuit courts’ 
hybridized tests.  Id. at 764.  The court concluded that the six-factor test is 
unnecessary and should not govern FMLA claims because the 8th 
Circuit’s hybrid test already “expressly takes into account ‘economic 
realities.’”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that the “hybrid test  . . . [,] 
[which is] governed by Darden[,]” controls definitions of employees 
under the FMLA.  Id. 
 
United States v. Henley, 766 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a wiretap order failed to comply with the 
“jurisdictional requirement” of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3), because “the target 
phone of the wiretap was based in Chicago during the entire course of the 
government’s investigation,” and Chicago was “outside the ‘territorial 
jurisdiction’ of the Eastern District of Missouri.”  Id. at  911. 
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ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the 2nd Circuit had previously 
held that “for purposes of § 2518(3)’s jurisdictional requirement, a 
communication is intercepted not only where the tapped telephone is 
located, but also where the contents of the redirected communication are 
first to be heard.”  Id.  The court found it persuasive that the 5th and 9th 
Circuit’s agreed with the 2nd Circuit’s conclusion, and stated that these 
courts concluded “that interception includes both the location of a tapped 
telephone and the original listening post, and that judges in either 
jurisdiction have authority . . . to issue wiretap orders.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 5th, and 9th 
Circuits, and held that a “judge sitting in the Eastern District of Missouri 
had jurisdiction to authorize the wiretap.”  Id. at 912. 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
 
Becker v. Williams, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1554 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2015) 
QUESTION: “Whether the category of ‘documents and instruments 
governing the plan’ described in § 1104(a)(1)(D) included beneficiary 
designation forms.”  Id. at 8. 
ANALYSIS: The court first started by examining a similar provision, 
29 U.S.C. §1 024(b)(4), which states that plan administers must provide a 
requesting party “with a copy of various plan documents, including SPDs, 
annual reports, terminal reports, bargaining agreements, trust agreements, 
contracts and ‘other instruments under which the plan is established or 
operated.’”  Id. at 8–9.  The court determined that the “other instruments” 
category was limited to those “similar in nature” to the documents 
specifically mentioned in § 1024(b)(4).  Id. at 9–10.  The court, finding 
that § 1024(b)(4)’s “other instruments” category overlaps with 
§ 1104(a)(1)(D)’s “documents and instruments governing the plan,” 
concluded that governing plan documents only includes those plans that 
provide “information as to ‘where the participant stands with respect to the 
plan.’”  Id. at 10. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that beneficiary designation 
forms do not constitute, or “were in any way incorporated into, governing 
plan documents.”  Id. at 12. 
 
Corber v. Xanodyne Pharms., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether “petitions to coordinate actions under 
California Code of Civil Procedure § 404 constitute[s] proposals for these 
actions to be tried jointly, making the actions a ‘mass action’ subject to 
federal jurisdiction under the [Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(CAFA)].”  Id. at 1222. 
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ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit reasoned that some claimants have tried 
structuring their complaints under § 404 in order to circumvent the 100-
plaintiff threshold under the CAFA, and remain in state court.  Id. at 1223.  
The court also noted that claimants are the masters of their complaints and 
petitions for coordination, and they will be held responsible for what they 
have stated and done.  Id.  The court further reasoned that invoking CAFA 
does not require an express request for a joint trial “in order to be a 
proposal to try the cases jointly.”  Id. at 1225. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that, under § 404, an assessment 
of the language used in a claimant’s memoranda in support of their 
petitions for coordination will determine whether a proposal for a joint 
trial was made.  Id. at 1223. 
 
Black Mesa Water Coalition v. Jewell, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1182 (9th 
Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act’s (SMCRA) fee “eligibility” determinations are subject to de novo 
review and “entitlement” determinations for abuse of discretion.  Id. at *7. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 4th Circuit determined that 
agency decisions under the “eligibility” prong of its fee award regulation 
are subject to de novo review because “whether a party achieved some 
degree of success on the merits is an interpretation based on general 
common law principles and not on expertise in the agency’s particular 
field.”  Id. at *8.  The court further noted that the 4th Circuit determined 
that “entitlement” determinations are factual findings made by the agency.  
Id. at *10. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit joined the 4th Circuit in holding that 
an agency’s “eligibility” determination is subject to de novo review and its 
“entitlement” determination is subject to the substantial evidence standard.  
Id. 
 
EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 768 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether Title VII’s prohibition against national origin 
discrimination prohibits the tribal hiring preferences in the mineral 
leases.”  Id. at 971. 
ANALYSIS: The court first reviewed the legislative history of Title 
VII, and found that  Title VII prohibits “discrimination in employment on 
the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  Id. at 968–
69.  The court further found that § 703(i) of Title VII “does not itself 
authorize or create an exemption for tribal hiring preferences on or near 
Indian reservations . . . .”  Id. at 969–70.  The court noted that Title VII 
provided two provisions that concerned Indians: The first was an exclusion 
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of “tribal governments from definition of employer” and the second being 
“a general exemption from Title VII for preferential hiring of Indians.”  Id. 
at 972.  The court concluded that the “Indian preference exemption 
expressly permits the preferential hiring” of Indians.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that tribal affiliation is a political 
classification and that “Title VII does not prohibit differential treatment 
based on this political classification.”  Id. at 967. 
 
Hughes v. United States, 770 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 
(2013), created a rule that can be applied retroactively on collateral review 
according to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b) and § 2255 (h).  Id.  at 815. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court had set 
the bar high regarding when the retroactive application of a newly 
articulated rule.  Id. at 817.  The court noted that there are two ways that a 
new rule can be applied to a previous case: (1) the Supreme Court 
expressly announces that the rule of a case applies retroactively, or (2) 
through multiple holdings.  Id.  The court found that, absent these two 
circumstances, “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be 
applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules 
are announced.”  Id.  The court stated that a rule of criminal procedure, 
such as the rule in the present case, would only apply retroactively if there 
were fundamental issues of fairness and accuracy in the criminal 
proceeding that were implicated and “the likelihood of an accurate 
conviction is seriously diminished.”  Id.  at 817–18. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the Supreme Court had not 
made Alleyne retroactive to cases that were on collateral review.  Id. at 
815. 
 
Shirk v. United States ex rel. Dept. of Interior, 773 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 
2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the United States may be held liable under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for the off-reservation actions of two 
tribal police officers.”  Id. at 1000. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting that, after Congress enacted 
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (“ISDEAA”) 
it “extended the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity to claims 
‘resulting from the performance of functions . . . under a contract, grant 
agreement, or cooperative agreement authorized by [§ 314 of the 
ISDEAA], as amended.”  Id. at 1003.  The court determined that § 314 
“requires courts to determine whether, under state law, an employee’s 
allegedly tortious action falls within the scope of his employment,” and 
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also requires a finding that the employee was “carrying out the contract or 
agreement.”  Id. at 1005.  The court articulated that, when putting these 
two requirements together, an employee’s conduct will be covered by the 
FTCA if, “while executing his contractual obligations under the relevant 
federal contract, his allegedly tortious conduct falls within the scope of 
employment as defined by state law.”  Id.  at 1005–06. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that, in order for the officers’ 
conduct to fall within the ambit of § 314 of the ISDEAA, the plaintiff must 
first prove that the a contract existed between the BIA and the tribe and 
that this contract covers the conduct, and second, that the acts fall within 
the employee’s scope of employment according to state law.  Id. at 1006. 
 
United States v. Johnson, 767 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether proof of the defendant’s responsibility for the 
witness’s absence must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence, as 
provided by Rule 804(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,” or by the 
clear and convincing evidence standard, as it pertains to the “so-called 
‘forfeiture exception’ to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment.” Id. at 817–18. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the “forfeiture exception” 
applies “when the defendant is responsible for the witness being 
unavailable.”  Id.  The court then looked to how other circuits have ruled, 
and found that, according to the 9th Circuit, other circuit courts addressing 
the forfeiture exception continue to apply the preponderance of the 
evidence standard.  Id.  The court specifically noted that the 2nd Circuit 
held the “forfeiture exception is governed by the preponderance 
standard[.]”  Id.  The court also considered a 4th Circuit holding, which 
stated that “the forfeiture exception should be read broadly in order to 
prevent defendants from undermining the integrity of the judicial 
process.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “in order to introduce 
evidence under the forfeiture exception, the Government must 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
intentionally secured the declarant’s absence.”  Id. at 822–23. 
 
United States v. Reyes Vera, 770 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “What is the appropriate remedy when a jury finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt facts that increase a defendant’s statutory 
sentencing range, but the jury’s finding was affected by trial error?”  Id. at 
1249. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit specifically considered whether it must 
“(1) vacate the entire conspiracy conviction and remand for a full 
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retrial . . . ; (2) vacate only the drug quantity findings in the special verdict, 
deny the government the option of retrying the drug quantity issue and 
require resentencing based solely on the defendants’ convictions; or (3) 
vacate only the drug quantity findings in the special verdict, but allow the 
government to resubmit the drug quantity questions to a sentencing jury.  
Id.  The court first looked to relevant case law to find that vacating the 
jury’s findings on one portion of the trial did not require the whole 
conviction to be vacated because the affected portion of the verdict was 
not an element of the offense charged.  Id. at 1249.  Instead, as the court 
noted, the tainted portion of the verdict was “the functional equivalent of 
an element” that was separately submitted to a jury for a finding of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt for the single purpose of sentencing.  Id.  
Further, the court stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude 
a retrial of an issue related to the tainted verdict, as it applies to insufficient 
evidence and not to trial error.  Id. at 1250.  The court distinguished its 
holding from those of the 1st and 4th Circuits, which relate to the tainted 
drug quantity verdicts which had been part of the underlying conspiracy 
charges.  Id. at 1252. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the appropriate remedy for 
such cases is to vacate the findings in the special verdict and allow the 
government to resubmit the questions to a sentencing jury.  Id. at 1249. 
 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
 
Barnes v. United States, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 876 (10th Cir. Jan. 21, 
2015) 
QUESTION: How the Federal Tort Claim Act’s (“FTCA”) 
administrative-exhaustion requirement, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), relates to the 
statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) .  Id. at *9. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that § 2675(a) specifies that a 
plaintiff must “have their administrative claims finally denied by the 
relevant federal agency,” or “if the agency fails to act on their 
administrative claims within six months of presentment, they may 
thereafter deemed the claims (constructively) denied.”  Id.  The court 
further noted that § 2401(b) bars a tort claim unless “action is begun within 
six months after the date of mailing . . . of notice of final denial of the 
claim by the agency to which it was presented.”  Id.  The court recognized 
that the 6th and 9th Circuits have considered the interplay between 
§ 2675(a) and § 2401(b), and concluded that an “administrative-
exhaustion requirement that dictates when a potential plaintiff’s 
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opportunity to initiate claims begins [] has no bearing on the point at which 
that opportunity ceases.”  Id. at *16. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the administrative-
exhaustion requirement’s “deemed denial” provision constitutes a “final 
denial” only for purposes of determining whether it is too early to file a 
claim.  Id. at *16. 
 
Kane Cnty., Utah v. United States, 772 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether a plaintiff must satisfy the “disputed title” 
element of the Quiet Title Act by showing an expressed dispute or if action 
that implicitly disputes the title is enough.  Id. at 1211. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the Quiet Title Act allows for claims 
to challenge the United States’ claim to real property.  Id. at 1210.  The 
court cited to their established rule “that waivers of sovereign immunity 
[as seen in the present case] are to be read narrowly.”  Id at 1211.  The 
court attempted to bar claims that simply create ambiguity regarding the 
plaintiff’s title.  Id. at 1212.  The court stressed the reality of parties settling 
their disputes amongst themselves before turning to the court.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that to satisfy the “disputed 
title” element of the Quiet Title Act, the plaintiff must show an expressed 
dispute of the title.  Id. 
 
Mallo v. IRS (In re Mallo), 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24560 (10th Cir. 
Dec. 29, 2014) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether an untimely 1040 Form, filed after the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has assessed the tax liability, is a tax return 
for purposes of the exceptions to discharge in [11 U.S.C ] § 523(a)(1)(B)(i) 
of the Bankruptcy Code.”  Id. at *1. 
ANALYSIS: The court first examined the language of the Bankruptcy 
Code statute, and noted that. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i) provides that “a debtor’s 
tax liabilities ‘with respect to which a return . . . was not filed’ are excepted 
from discharge.”  Id.  The court recognized that “the hanging paragraph 
added by Congress in 2005 defines return as a document that satisfies the 
requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing 
requirements).”  Id. at *14. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court 
further noted that the 5th Circuit had previously held that the applicable 
filing requirements for state returns included the filing deadline.  Id. at 
*16. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that an untimely filed tax form 
“cannot constitute a ‘return’ for the purposes of dischargeability because 
the due date is an ‘applicable filing requirement.’”  Id. at *17. 
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Tennille v. West Union Co., 774 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether an appeal bond can, as a matter of law, cover 
the cost of notifying class members of Objectors’ merits appeals and the 
cost of maintaining the settlement pending those appeals.” Id. at 1254. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that Fed. R. App. P. 7 allows the district 
courts to require appellants to file a bond “in any form and amount 
necessary to ensure payment of costs on appeal.”  Id.  The court stated that 
other circuit courts have consistently defined “costs on appeal” as costs an 
appellant can recover “pursuant to a specific rule or statute.”  Id. at 1254.  
The court noted that the while circuit courts disagree as to what “costs a 
Rule 7 appeal bond can cover,” the circuits are in agreement that “costs on 
appeal” is consistently defined for Rule 7 purposes “as appellate costs 
expressly provided for by a rule or statute.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that, “[b]ecause Plaintiffs have 
not identified any rule or statute that allows them to recover, as costs on 
appeal, funds spent either notifying class members of Objectors’ merits 
appeals or maintaining the settlement pending those appeals, the district 
court erred in imposing a Rule 7 appeal bond that included those costs.”  
Id. at 1256. 
 
 
 
United States v. Powers, 578 Fed. App’x 763 (10th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: Whether the applicable definition of “participants” in a 
fraudulent scheme, as it pertains to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(14)(A) should 
coincide with the definition of “participant” set forth in comment note 1 
of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, and “ask whether an individual was a ‘participant’ in 
the ‘relevant conduct’ as defined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).”   Id. at 
780. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit first noted “the commentary to 
[U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(14)(A)] explains ‘the defendant shall be considered 
to have derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts if the gross receipts 
to the defendant individually, rather than to all participants, exceeded 
$1,000,000.’”  Id.  The court then clarified that “district courts identifying 
‘participants’ in a fraud for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(14)(A) should 
employ the definition of ‘participant’ set forth in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. 
n.1 and ask whether an individual was a ‘participant’ in the ‘relevant 
conduct’ as defined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).”  Id.  The Court lastly 
noted that identical words used in different parts of the same act are 
intended to have the same meaning, and in § 3B1, the advisory committee 
defined ‘participant’ as “a person who is criminally responsible for the 
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commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted, while a 
person who is not criminally responsible for the commission of the offense 
(e.g., an undercover law enforcement officer) is not a participant.”  Id. at 
781–82. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that “‘participants’ for 
purposes of the gross-receipts enhancement of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 should be 
read consistently with the role-in-the-offense definition of the essentially 
identical term in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.”  Id.  at 782. 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Collins v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 50 
(11th Cir. Jan. 5, 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether an alleged violation of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 168i (a), which requires a consumer 
reporting agency to conduct a “reasonable reinvestigation” of disputed 
consumer credit information, must be disclosed to a third party for a 
consumer to recover actual damages.  Id. at *2. 
ANALYSIS: The court first looked at the plain meaning of the statute 
to differentiate between portions of the statute concerning consumer credit 
reports and files, noting that there is no requirement for communication to 
a third party when a consumer notifies the agency that there is a dispute 
concerning his file.  Id. at *12.  The court further considered Congressional 
intent and cited case law to note that “Congress enacted FCRA in 1970 to 
ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking 
system, and protect consumer privacy.”  Id. at *6.  The court reasoned that 
under the FCRA there is a private right of action against consumer 
reporting agencies for any willful or negligent violation of the statute 
under sections 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681o and 1681n.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that publication to a third party 
of a consumer’s credit file was not needed for a consumer to recover actual 
damages under 15 U.S.C. § 168i (a).  Id. at *13. 
 
Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2015) 
QUESTION: Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, authorizes suits for money damages 
against officers in their official capacities.  Id. at 1290. 
ANALYSIS: The court first addressed whether “Congress authorized 
suits for money damages against officers in their official capacities when 
it passed the RFRA.”  Id.  The court noted that “Congress must clearly 
waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity,” but this does not 
mean that Congress must utilize “specific language, and the sovereign 
immunity canon . . . does not displace the other traditional tools of stator 
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construction.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court found it 
persuasive that that the Supreme Court had previously held that “identical 
‘appropriate relief’ language in the related [Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act] did not waive states’ sovereign immunity 
for money damages.”  Id.  Lastly, the court noted that the only two circuit 
courts to decide this issue, the 9th and D.C. Circuits, held that Congress 
did not waive sovereign immunity in this context.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “Congress did not 
unequivocally waive its sovereign immunity in passing the RFRA,” and 
thus, the RFRA does not authorize “suits for money damages against 
officers in their official capacities.”  Id. at 1210. 
 
Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether a [cruise ship] passenger might invoke the 
principles of actual agency, or those of apparent agency, to impute to a 
cruise line liability for the medical negligence of its onboard nurse and 
doctor.  Id. at 1228. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit recently emphasized that issues of 
vicarious liability raise factual questions.  Id.  Further, the court found that 
there is no reason to “carve out a special exemption for all acts of onboard 
medical negligence.”  Id.  The court specifically stated that the issue of 
whether an agency relationship exists “is a question of fact under the 
general maritime law.”  Id. at 1235–36.  The court declined to adopt old 
rule regarding negligence aboard a ship which stated that “shipowners 
cannot control onboard medical personnel because the doctor-
patient . . . relationship ‘is under the control of the passengers themselves,” 
reasoning that the old rule has not adapted to the “evolution of legal 
norms.”  Id. at 1228, 1241.  T 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that courts must conduct a case 
by case analysis under maritime law in order to determine whether or not 
actual or apparent agency exists.  Id. at 1241. 
 
Jeffrey M. Stein, D.D.S., M.S.D., P.A. v. Buccaneers L.P., 772 F.3d 698 
(11th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION ONE: “Whether an individual plaintiff’s claim becomes 
moot when the plaintiff does not accept a Rule 68 offer of judgment that, 
if accepted, would provide all the relief the plaintiff seeks.”   Id. at 702. 
ANALYSIS: The court first analyzed Fed. R. Civ. P. 68, and then 
looked to the dissent in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczk, 133 S. Ct. 
1523 (2013), which stated that “as long as the parties have a concrete 
interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not 
moot,” and the case is moot “only when it is impossible for a court to grant 
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any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.”   Id. at 702-03.   The 
court noted that this proposition does not change even though a party 
rejected a settlement offer.   Id. at 703. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that individual claims are not 
moot even after the plaintiff fails to accept a Rule 68 offer.   Id. at 704. 
QUESTION TWO: “[W]hether, if the answer is yes and such offers 
are made to all the named plaintiffs in a proposed class action before they 
move to certify a class, the named plaintiffs may nonetheless go forward 
as class representatives.”   Id. at 702. 
ANALYSIS: The court started its analysis by stating “the necessary 
personal stake in a live class-action controversy sometimes is present even 
when the named plaintiff’s own individual claim has become moot.”   Id. 
at 705.   The court noted that the “legal status of class members’ changes 
not when a motion to certify is filed but when a certification order is 
entered.”   Id. at 707.   The court further posited that “the relation-back 
doctrine allows a named plaintiff whose individual claims are moot to 
represent class members not because the named plaintiff has moved to 
certify a class but because the named plaintiff will adequately present the 
class claims and unless the named plaintiff is allowed to do so the class 
claims will be capable of repetition, yet evading review.”  Id. at 707. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “even if the individual 
claims are somehow deemed moot, the class claims remain live, and the 
named plaintiffs retain the ability to pursue them.”   Id. at 704. 
 
United States v. Mathis, 767 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a cell phone is a “computer” within the 
meaning of [18 U.S.C.] § 1030 (e)(1).”  Id. at 1283. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that the 8th Circuit has already 
answered this issue in the affirmative and has held that a cell phone is a 
computer under this statute.  Id.  The 11th Circuit agreed with the 8th 
Circuit’s determination that the language of the statute is broad enough to 
encompass any device that uses a data processor.  Id.  The court also agreed 
that any time the cell phone performs a task, “it performs logical, 
arithmetic or storage functions.”  Id.  The court further concluded that, 
since the statute does not require any sort of Internet connection to be 
considered a computer, a cell phone is easily defined as a computer.  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that a cell phone is a computer 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1), and thus, the defendant’s use of a cell phone 
to call and send text messages warranted imposition of an enhancement 
under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6).  Id. 
2015] First Impressions 379 
D.C. CIRCUIT 
United States v. Hite, 769 F.3d 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: “Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) requires direct 
communications with a minor” in order to find criminal liability.  Id. at 
1158. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that seven of its sister circuits, the 
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits, have considered this issue, 
and have “rejected a categorical requirement that the defendant 
communicate directly with a minor, rather than through an adult 
intermediary.”  Id. at 1160.  The court, after analyzing the language of 
§ 2422(b), found that the “ordinary meanings of the verbs” used within the 
statute “demonstrate that § 2422(b) is intended to prohibit acts that seek to 
transform or overcome the will of a minor.”  Id.  at 1161.  The court further 
noted that, while it may be true that these verbs typically describe direct 
interactions, it could not “ignore that customary usage of these verbs also 
includes the use of intermediaries to transform or overcome another’s 
will.”  Id. 
CONCLUSION: The D.C. Circuit held that “a defendant can be 
convicted under § 2422(b) for communicating an adult intermediary, if the 
defendant’s communications with the intermediary are aimed at 
persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing the minor.”  Id. at 1158. 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
 
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
QUESTION: What should the court take into consideration when 
determining a jury instruction for the reasonable royalty rates of a patent 
encumbered by “reasonable, and non-discriminatory” (“RAND”) terms.  
Id. at 1229. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by reasoning that there is no uniform 
factor based test that courts can “parrot” for every case involving RAND-
encumbered patents. Id. at 1230.  The Federal Circuit noted that district 
courts should instruct the jury on the actual RAND commitment at issue 
and must be cautious not to instruct the jury on any factors that 
are not relevant to the record developed at trial.  Id.  The court determined 
that district courts must clarify to the jury that any royalty award must be 
based on the incremental value of the invention, not the value of the 
standard as a whole or any increased value the patented feature gains from 
its inclusion in the standard.  Id. at 1231. The court also determined that if 
an accused infringer wants an instruction on patent hold-up and royalty 
stacking, it must provide evidence on the record of patent hold-up and 
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royalty stacking in relation to both the RAND commitment at issue and 
the specific technology referenced therein.  Id. at 1229. 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that “district courts must 
instruct the jury only on the relevant factors specific to the case at issue.” 
Id. at 1235. 
 
